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ABSTRACT
With millions of images that are shared online on social network-
ing sites, eective methods for image privacy prediction are highly
needed. In this paper, we propose an approach for fusing object,
scene context, and image tags modalities derived from convolu-
tional neural networks for accurately predicting the privacy of
images shared online. Specically, our approach identies the set
of most competent modalities on the y, according to each new
target image whose privacy has to be predicted. e approach con-
siders three stages to predict the privacy of a target image, wherein
we rst identify the neighborhood images that are visually similar
and/or have similar sensitive content as the target image. en, we
estimate the competence of the modalities based on the neighbor-
hood images. Finally, we fuse the decisions of the most competent
modalities and predict the privacy label for the target image. Ex-
perimental results show that our approach predicts the sensitive
(or private) content more accurately than the models trained on
individual modalities (object, scene, and tags) and prior privacy
prediction works. Also, our approach outperforms strong base-
lines, that train meta-classiers to obtain an optimal combination
of modalities.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Technology today oers innovative ways to share photos with peo-
ple all around the world, making online photo sharing an incredibly
popular activity for Internet users. ese users document daily de-
tails about their whereabouts through images and also post pictures
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of their signicant milestones and private events, e.g., family pho-
tos and cocktail parties [28]. Furthermore, smartphones and other
mobile devices facilitate the exchange of information in content
sharing sites virtually at any time, in any place. Although current
social networking sites allow users to change their privacy prefer-
ences, this is oen a cumbersome task for the vast majority of users
on the Web, who face diculties in assigning and managing privacy
seings [30]. Even though users change their privacy seings to
comply with their personal privacy preference, they oen misjudge
the private information in images, which fails to enforce their own
privacy preferences [35]. us, new privacy concerns [13] are on
the rise and mostly emerge due to users’ lack of understanding
that semantically rich images may reveal sensitive information
[1, 35, 47, 57]. For example, a seemingly harmless photo of a birth-
day party may unintentionally reveal sensitive information about a
person’s location, personal habits, and friends. Along these lines,
Gross and Acquisti [17] analyzed more than 4,000 Carnegie Mel-
lon University students’ Facebook proles and outlined potential
threats to privacy. e authors found that users oen provide per-
sonal information generously on social networking sites, but they
rarely change default privacy seings, which could jeopardize their
privacy. Employers oen perform background checks for their
future employees using social networking sites and about 8% of
companies have already red employees due to their inappropriate
social media content [54]. A study carried out by the Pew Research
center reported that 11% of the users of social networking sites
regret the content they posted [33].
Motivated by the fact that increasingly online users’ privacy
is routinely compromised by using social and content sharing ap-
plications [58], recently, researchers started to explore machine
learning and deep learning models to automatically identify pri-
vate or sensitive content in images [35, 45, 49–52, 57]. Starting
from the premise that the objects and scene contexts present in
images impact images’ privacy, many of these studies used objects,
scenes, and user tags, or their combination (i.e., feature-level or
decision-level fusion) to infer adequate privacy classication for
online images.
However, we conjecture that simply combining objects, scenes
and user tags modalities using feature-level fusion (i.e., concate-
nation of all object, scene and user tag features) or decision-level
fusion (i.e., aggregation of decisions from classiers trained on
objects, scenes and tags) may not always help to identify the sen-
sitive content of images. Figure 1 illustrates this phenomenon
through several images. For example, let us consider image (a) in
the gure. Both feature-level and decision-level fusion models yield
very low private class probabilities (Feature-level fusion: 0.21 and
decision-level fusion: 0.33). Interestingly, a model based on the
scene context (bedroom) of the image outputs a high probability of
0.62, showing that the scene based model is competent to capture
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Single modality is correct
Image Tags Probabilities
Base classiers Fusion
bed, studio scene: 0.62 Feature-level: 0.21
dining table object: 0.5 Decision-level: 0.33
(a) speakers, music tags: 0.29
birthday scene: 0.57 Feature-level: 0.21
night object: 0.78 Decision-level: 0.33
(b) party, life tags: 0.39
toeic, native scene: 0.02 Feature-level: 0.27
speaker, text object: 0.15 Decision-level: 0.33
(c) document, pen tags: 0.86
Multiple modalities are correct
Image Tags Probabilities
Base classiers Fusion
girl, baby scene: 0.49 Feature-level: 0.77
indoor, people object: 0.87 Decision-level: 0.67
(d) canon tags: 0.97
people, party scene: 0.92 Feature-level: 0.69
awesome, tea object: 0.38 Decision-level: 0.67
(e) bed, blanket tags: 0.7
indoor, fun scene: 0.92 Feature-level: 0.89
party object: 0.73 Decision-level: 1
(f) people tags: 0.77
Figure 1: Anecdotal evidence of private images and their tags. e feature-level fusion is given as the concatenation of all the
features (object, scene, tag) and the decision-level fusion is obtained by averaging the predictions.
the sensitive content of the image on its own. Similarly, for the
image (b) (self-portrait) in Figure 1, where scene context is seldom
in the visual content, the objects in the image (the “persons,” “cock-
tail dress”) are more useful (0.78) to predict appropriate image’s
privacy. Moreover, for images such as “personal documents” (image
(c)), user-annotated tags provide broader context (such as type and
purpose of the document), capturing the sensitive content (0.86),
that objects and scene obtained through images’ content failed to
capture. On the other hand, in some cases, we can nd more than
one competent model for an image (e.g., for image (d)). To this end,
we propose a novel approach that dynamically fuses multi-modal
information of online images, derived through Convolutional Neu-
ral Networks (CNNs), to adequately identify the sensitive image
content. In summary, we make the following contributions:
• Our signicant contribution is to estimate the competence
of object, scene and tag modalities for privacy prediction
and dynamically identify the most competent modalities
for a target image whose privacy has to be predicted.
• We derive “competence” features from the neighborhood
regions of a target image and learn classiers on them to
identify whether a modality is competent to accurately
predict the privacy of the target image. To derive these
features, we consider privacy and visual neighborhoods
of the target image to bring both sensitive and visually
similar image content closer.
• We provide an in-depth analysis of our algorithm in an
ablation seing, where we record the performance of the
proposed approach by removing its various components.
e analysis outline the crucial components of our ap-
proach.
• Our results show that we identify images’ sensitive content
more accurately than single modality models (object, scene,
and tag), multi-modality baselines and prior approaches of
privacy prediction, depicting that the approach optimally
combines the multi-modality for privacy prediction.
2 RELATEDWORK
We briey review the related work as follows.
Ensemble models and Multi-Modality. Several works used
ensemble classiers (or bagging) to improve image classications
[11, 31, 39]. Bagging is an ensemble technique that builds a set of
diverse classiers, each trained on a random sample of the training
data to improve the nal (aggregated) classier condence [4, 43].
Dynamic ensembles that extend bagging have also been proposed
[7, 9, 10] wherein a pool of classiers are trained on a single feature
set (single modality) using the bagging technique [4, 43], and the
competence of the base classiers is determined dynamically.
Ensemble classiers are also used in the multi-modal seing
[18, 38], where dierent modalities have been coupled, e.g., im-
ages and text for image retrieval [23] and image classication [18],
and audio and visual signals for speech classication [34]. Za-
havy et al. [2018] highlighted that classiers trained on dierent
modalities can vary in their discriminative ability and urged the
development of optimal unication methods to combine dierent
classiers. Besides, merging the Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) architectures corresponding to various modalities, that can
vary in depth, width, and the optimization algorithm can become
very complex. However, there is a potential to improve the perfor-
mance through multi-modal information fusion, which intrigued
various researchers [16, 22, 23, 32]. For example, Frome et al. [14]
merged an image network [25] with a Skip-gram Language Model
to improve classication on ImageNet. Zahavy et al. [2018] pro-
posed a policy network for multi-modal product classication in
e-commerce using text and visual content, which learns to choose
between the input signals. Feichtenhofer et al. [2016] fused CNNs
both spatially and temporally for activity recognition in videos
to take advantage of the spatio-temporal information present in
videos. Wang et al. [2015] designed an architecture to combine
object networks and scene networks, which extract useful informa-
tion such as objects and scene contexts for event understanding.
Co-training approaches [3] use multiple views (or modalities) to
“guide” dierent classiers in the learning process. However, co-
training methods are semi-supervised and assume that all views are
“sucient” for learning. In contrast with the above approaches, we
aim to capture dierent aspects of images, obtained from multiple
modalities (object, scene, and tags), with each modality having a
dierent competence power, and perform dynamic multi-modal
fusion for image privacy prediction.
Online Image Privacy. Several works are carried out to study
users’ privacy concerns in social networks, privacy decisions about
sharing resources, and the risk associated with them [15, 19, 24,
36, 37, 42]. Ahern et al. [1] examined privacy decisions and con-
siderations in mobile and online photo sharing. ey explored
critical aspects of privacy such as users’ consideration for privacy
decisions, content and context based paerns of privacy decisions,
how dierent users adjust their privacy decisions and user behavior
towards personal information disclosure. e authors concluded
that applications, which could support and inuence user’s privacy
decision-making process should be developed. Jones and O’Neill
[21] reinforced the role of privacy-relevant image concepts. For
instance, they determined that people are more reluctant to share
photos capturing social relationships than photos taken for func-
tional purposes; certain seings such as work, bars, concerts cause
users to share less. Besmer and Lipford [2] mentioned that users
want to regain control over their shared content, but meanwhile,
they feel that conguring proper privacy seings for each image
is a burden. Buschek et al. [2015] presented an approach to assign
privacy to shared images using metadata (location, time, shot de-
tails) and visual features (faces, colors, edges). Zerr et al. [2012]
developed the PicAlert dataset, containing Flickr photos, to help
detect private images and also proposed a privacy-aware image
classication approach to learn classiers on these Flickr photos.
Authors considered image tags and visual features such as color
histograms, faces, edge-direction coherence, and SIFT for the pri-
vacy classication task. Squicciarini et al. [2014, 2017] found that
SIFT and image tags work best for predicting sensitivity of user’s
images. Given the recent success of CNNs, Tran et al. [2016], and
Tonge and Caragea [2016, 2018] showed promising privacy predic-
tions compared with visual features such as SIFT and GIST. Yu et al.
[2017] adopted CNNs to achieve semantic image segmentation and
also learned object-privacy relatedness to identify privacy-sensitive
objects.
Spyromitros-Xious et al. [2016] used features extracted from
CNNs to provide personalized image privacy classication, whereas
Zhong et al. [2017] proposed a Group-Based Personalized Model
for image privacy classication in online social media sites. Despite
that an individual’s sharing behavior is unique, Zhong et al. [2017]
argued that personalized models generally require large amounts
of user data to learn reliable models, and are time and space con-
suming to train and to store models for each user, while taking into
account possible deviations due to sudden changes of users’ sharing
activities and privacy preferences. Orekondy et al. [35] dened a
set of privacy aributes, which were rst predicted from the image
content and then used these aributes in combination with users
preferences to estimate personalized privacy risk. e authors used
ocial online social network rules to dene the set of aributes,
instead of collecting real user’s opinions about sensitive content
and hence, the denition of sensitive content may not meet a user’s
actual needs [29]. Additionally, for privacy aribute prediction,
the authors ne-tuned a CNN pre-trained on object dataset. In
contrast, we proposed a dynamic multi-modal fusion approach to
determine which aspects of images (objects, scenes or tags) are
more competent to predict images’ privacy.
3 MULTI-MODALITY
e sensitive content of an image can be perceived by the presence
of one or more objects, the scenes described by the visual content
and the description associated with it in the form of tags [45, 49–
51]. We derive features (object, scene, tags) corresponding to the
multi-modal information of online images as follows.
Object (Fo ): Detecting objects from images is clearly funda-
mental to assessing whether an image is of private nature. For
example, a single element such as a rearm, political signs, may be
a strong indicator of a private image. Hence, we explore the image
descriptions extracted from VGG-16 [41], a CNN pre-trained on the
ImageNet dataset [40] that has 1.2M+ images labeled with 1, 000
object categories. e VGG-16 network implements a 16 layer deep
network; a stack of convolutional layers with a very small receptive
eld: 3 × 3 followed by fully-connected layers. e architecture
contains 13 convolutional layers and 3 fully-connected layers. e
input to the network is a xed-size 224 × 224 RGB image. e
activation of the fully connected layers capture the complete object
contained in the region of interest. Hence, we use the activation of
the last fully-connected layer of VGG-16, i.e., fc8 as a feature vector.
e dimension of object features Fo is 1000.
Scene (F s ): As consistently shown in various user-centered
studies [1], the context of an image is a potentially strong indicator
of what type of message or event users are trying to share online.
ese scenes, e.g., some nudity, home, fashion events, concerts
are also oen linked with certain privacy preferences. Similar to
object features, we obtain the scene descriptors derived from the
last fully-connected layer of the pre-trained VGG-16 [25] on the
Places2 dataset which contains 365 scene classes within 2.5 million
images [60]. e dimension of scene features F s is 365.
Image Tags (F t ): For image tags, we employ the CNN architec-
ture of Collobert et al. [8]. e network contains one convolution
layer on top of word vectors obtained from an unsupervised neural
language model. e rst layer embeds words into the word vectors
pre-trained by Le and Mikolov [27] on 100 billion words of Google
News, and are publicly available. e next layer performs convolu-
tions on the embedded word vectors using multiple lter sizes of 3,
4 and 5, where we use 128 lters from each size and produce a tag
feature representation. A max-pooling operation over the feature
map is applied to capture the most important feature of length 256
for each feature map. To derive these features, we consider two
types of tags: (1) user tags, and (2) deep tags. Because not all images
on social networking sites have user tags or the set of user tags is
very sparse [48], we predict the top d object categories (or deep
tags) from the probability distribution extracted from CNN.
Object + Scene + Tag (Fost ): We use the combination of the
object, scene, and tag features to identify the neighborhood of a
target image. We explore various ways given in [12] to combine the
features. For example, we use fc7 layer of VGG to extract features
of equal length of 4096 from both object-net and scene-net and
consider the max-pooling of these vectors to combine these features.
Note that, in this work, we only describe the combination of features
that worked best for the approach. We obtain high-level object “Fo”
and scene “F s ” features from fc8 layer of object-net and scene-net
respectively and concatenate them with the tag features as follows:
Fost = f cat (Fo , F s , F t ). Fost = Fo (i), 1 ≤ i ≤ 1000, Fost (i +
1000) = F s (i), 1 ≤ i ≤ 365, Fost (i + 1365) = F t (i), 1 ≤ i ≤ 256.
4 PROPOSED APPROACH
We seek to classify a given image into one of the two classes: private
or public, based on users’ general privacy preferences. To achieve
this, we depart from previous works that use the same model on all
image types (e.g., portraits, bedrooms, and legal documents), and
propose an approach called “Dynamic Multi-Modal Fusion for Pri-
vacy Prediction” (or DMFP), that eectively fuses multi-modalities
(object, scene, and tags) and dynamically captures dierent aspects
or particularities from image. Specically, the proposed approach
aims to estimate the competence of models trained on these indi-
vidual modalities for each target image (whose privacy has to be
predicted) and dynamically identies the subset of the most “compe-
tent” models for that image. e rationale for the proposed method
is that for a particular type of sensitive content, some modalities
may be important, whereas others may be irrelevant and may sim-
ply introduce noise. Instead, a smaller subset of modalities may be
signicant in capturing a particular type of sensitive content (e.g.,
objects for portraits, scenes for interior home or bedroom, and tags
for legal documents, as shown in Figure 1).
e proposed approach considers three stages to predict the
privacy of a target image, wherein we rst identify the neighbor-
hood images that are visually similar and/or have similar sensitive
content as the target image (Section 4.1). en, using a set of base
classiers, each trained on an individual modality, we estimate the
competence of the modalities by determining which modalities
classify the neighborhood images correctly (Section 4.2). e goal
here is to select the most competent modalities for a particular
type of images (e.g., scene for home images). Finally, we fuse the
decisions of the most competent base classiers (corresponding to
the most competent modalities) and predict the privacy label for
the target image (Section 4.3).
Our approach considers two datasets, denoted as DT and DE ,
that contain images labeled as private or public. We use the dataset
DT to train a base classier for each modality to predict whether
an image is public or private. Particularly, we train 3 base classiers
B = {Bo ,Bs ,Bt } on the corresponding modality feature sets from
F . Note that we use the combination of feature sets Fost only for
visual content similarity and do not train a base classier on it.
e competences of these base classiers are estimated on the DE
dataset. We explain the stages of the proposed approach as follows.
e notation used is shown in Table 1.
4.1 Identication of Neighborhoods
e competence of a base classier is estimated based on a local
region where the target image is located. us, given a target image
T , we rst estimate two neighborhoods for T : (1) visual similarity
based (NTV ) and (2) privacy prole based (N
T
P ) neighborhoods.
e neighborhood NTV of target image T consists of the kv most
similar images fromDE using visual content similarity. Specically,
using the Fost features obtained by concatenating object, scene, and
tag features (as explained in Section 3), we determine the kv most
visually similar images to T by applying the K-Nearest Neighbors
algorithm on the DE dataset.
Notation Description
DT = {(I1, Y1), · · · , (Im, Ym )} a dataset of labeled images for base
classier training.
DE = {(X1, Y1), · · · , (Xn, Yn )} a dataset of labeled images for
competence estimation.
T A target image with an unknown privacy label.
F = {F o, F s , F t , F ost } a collection of modality feature sets of
object, scene, tag, and object+scene+tag, respectively.
B = {Bo, Bs , Bt } a set of base classiers trained on correspond-
ing modality feature sets from F (e.g., Bo is trained on F o ).
NTV e visual similarity based neighborhood of image T estimated
using visual content features F ost , i.e., the set of most similar
images to T based on visual content.
kv e size of NTV , where 1 ≤ kv < n.
NTP e privacy prole based neighborhood of target T , i.e., the set
of most similar images to T based on images’ privacy proles.
kp e size of NTP , where 1 ≤ kp < n.
C = {Co, Cs , C t } a set of “competence” classiers corresponding
to the base classiers from B (e.g., Co for Bo ).
Φ = {ϕo, ϕs , ϕt } a set of “competence” feature vectors for train-
ing the “competence” classiers.
Table 1: Mathematical notations.
e neighborhood NTP of target image T consists of kp most
similar images to T by calculating the cosine similarity between
the privacy prole of T and images from the dataset DE . We
dene privacy prole (denoted by T ) of image T as a vector of
posterior privacy probabilities obtained by the base classiers B
i.e., T =
⋃
Bi ∈B{P(YT = private |T ,Bi ), P(YT = public |T ,Bi )}.
For image (a) in Figure 1, T = [0.62, 0.38, 0.5, 0.5, 0.29, 0.71]. We
consider the privacy prole of images because images of particular
image content (bedroom images or legal documents) tend to possess
similar privacy probabilities with respect to the set of base classiers
B. For instance, irrespective of various kinds of bedroom images,
the probabilities for a private class obtained by base classiers
B, would be similar. is enables us to bring sensitive content
closer irrespective of their disparate visual content. Moreover, we
consider two dierent numbers of nearest neighbors kv and kp to
nd the neighborhoods since the competence of a base classier
is dependent on the neighborhood and estimating an appropriate
number of neighbors for the respective neighborhoods reduces the
noise.
4.2 “Competence” Estimation
We now describe how we estimate the “competence” of a base
classier. For instance, for the image (a) in Figure 1, scene model
has a higher competence than the others, and here, we capture
this competence through “competence” features and “competence”
classiers. Specically, we train a competence classier for each
base classier that predicts if the base classier is competent or
not for a target image T . e features for learning the competence
classiers and the competence learning are described below.
4.2.1 Derivation of “Competence” Features. We dene three dif-
ferent sets of “competence” features wherein each set of these fea-
tures captures a dierent criterion to estimate the level of compe-
tence of base classiers dynamically. e rst competence feature
ϕ1, for image T , is derived from the neighborhood NTV (based on
Algorithm 1 e “Competence” Learning
1: Input: A dataset DE = {(X1,Y1), · · · , (Xn ,Yn )} of labeled
images; FostX j combination of modality feature sets for X j ; a set
of base classiers B = {Bo ,Bs ,Bt }.
2: Output: A set of “competence” classiers C = {Co ,Cs ,Ct }.
3: D = {Do ,Ds ,Dt } ← ∅; // Datasets for training competence classi-
ers, initially empty.
4: C ← ∅; // A set of competence classiers, initially empty.
5: for all X j ∈ DE do
6: N
X j
V ← Identi f yVisualNeiдhborhood(kv ,X j , FostX j ,D
E );
// kv nearest neighbors of X j obtained using visual content similarity.
7: X j ← ComputePrivacyPro f ile(X j ,B); //Privacy prole.
8: N
X j
P = Identi f yPrivacyNeiдhborhood(kp ,X j ,DE ); // kp
most similar images of X j obtained using privacy prole similarity.
9: for all Bi ∈ B do // Iterate through the set of base classiers.
10: ϕi, j ← CompetenceFeatures(X j ,NX jV ,N
X j
P ,Bi );
11: if Predict(Bi ,X j ) = Yj then // predicted correctly.
12: Li, j ← 1; // Bi is competent for X j .
13: else
14: Li, j ← 0; // Bi is not competent for X j .
15: end if
16: Di ← Di ∪ {(ϕi, j ,Li, j )}
17: end for
18: end for
19: for all Di ∈ D do // Train competence classiers.
20: Ci ← TrainCompetenceClassi f ier (Di );
21: C ← C ∪Ci
22: end for
23: return C;
visual similarity) whereas the second competence feature ϕ2 is ob-
tained from the neighborhood NTP (based on privacy prole). e
third competence feature ϕ3 captures the level of condence of
base classiers for predicting the privacy of the image (T ) itself.
We create a “competence” feature vector by concatenating all these
competence features ϕ = {ϕ1 ∪ ϕ2 ∪ ϕ3} into a vector of length
|ϕ | = kv + kp + 1. We extract such competence vectors correspond-
ing to each base classier in B (e.g., ϕo for Bo , refer to Figure 2).
We extract these “competence” features as follows.
ϕ1: A vector of kv entries that captures the correctness of a base
classier in the visual neighborhood region NTV . An entry j in ϕ1
is 1 if a base classier Bi ∈ B accurately predicts privacy of image
X j ∈ NTV , and is 0 otherwise, where j = 1, · · · ,kv . For the target
image in Figure 2, ϕ1 = {1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1}, obtained by Bo .
ϕ2: A vector of kp entries that captures the correctness of a base
classier in the privacy prole neighborhood region NTP . An entry
j in ϕ2 is 1 if a base classier Bi ∈ B accurately predicts privacy of
image X j ∈ NTP , and is 0 otherwise, where j = 1, · · · ,kp . For the
target image in Figure 2, ϕ2 = {1, 1, 1, 1, 1}, obtained using Bo .
ϕ3: We capture a degree of condence of base classiers for
target image T . Particularly, we consider the maximum posterior
probability obtained for target image T using base classier Bi i.e.
Max(P(YT = Private |T ,Bi ), P(YT = Public |T ,Bi )), where Bi ∈ B.
For the target image in Figure 2, ϕ3 = 0.67, obtained using Bo .
Algorithm 2 Dynamic Fusion of Multi-Modality
1: Input: A target image T ; DE = {(X1,Y1), · · · , (Xn ,Yn )} a
dataset of labeled images; FostT combination of modality feature
sets for T ; a set of base classiers B = {Bo ,Bs ,Bt }; and a set
of competence classiers C = {Co ,Cs ,Ct }.
2: Output: Privacy label YT .
3: B′ ← ∅; // the subset of most competent base classiers.
4: CS ← ∅; // the set of competence scores.
5: Tba ← Aдreement(B,T ); // Base classiers’ agreement onT ’s label.
6: if Tba ≤ |B| then
7: NTV ← Identi f yVisualNeiдhborhood(kv ,T , FostT ,DE ); //
kv nearest neighbors of T obtained using visual content similarity.
8: T ← ComputePrivacyPro f ile(T ,B); //Privacy prole of T .
9: NTP = Identi f yPrivacyNeiдhborhood(kp ,T ,DE ); // kp
most similar images of T obtained using privacy prole similarity.
10: for all Bi ∈ B & Ci ∈ C do // Iterate through the set of base
and competence classiers.
11: ϕi ← CompetenceFeatures(T ,NTV ,NTP ,Bi );
12: CSi ← PredictCompetence(Fi ,Ci ); // Predict competence
score for base classier Bi .
13: if CSi > 0.5 then // If the predicted competence score is
greater than 0.5 then the base classier Bi is competent.
14: B′ ← B′ ∪ {Bi }
15: CS ← CS ∪ {CSi }
16: end if
17: end for
18: YT = WeiдhtedMajorityVote(T ,B′,CS) // Votes are rst
weighted by the competence score and then majority vote is taken.
19: end if
20: return YT
4.2.2 “Competence” Learning. We learn the “competence” of a
base classier by training a binary “competence” classier on the
dataset DE in a Training Phase. A competence classier predicts
whether a base classier is competent or not for a target image.
Algorithm 1 describes the “competence” learning process in de-
tails. Mainly, we consider images from DE as target images (for
the training purpose only) and identify both the neighborhoods
(NV , NP ) from the dataset DE itself (Alg. 1, lines 6–8). en, we
extract “competence” features for each base classier in B based on
the images from these neighborhoods (Alg. 1, line 10). To reduce
noise, we extract “competence” features by considering only the
images belonging to both the neighborhoods. On these “compe-
tence” features, we train a collection of “competence” classiers
C corresponding to each base classier in B (Alg. 1, lines 19–22).
Precisely, we train 3 competence classiers C = {Co ,Cs ,Ct }. To
train “competence” classier Ci ∈ C, we consider label Li = 1 if
base classier Bi ∈ B predicts the correct privacy of a target image
(here, X j ∈ DE ), otherwise 0 (Alg. 1, lines 11–16).
4.3 Dynamic Fusion of Multi-Modality
In this stage, for given target image T , we dynamically determine
the subset of most competent base classiers. We formalize the
process of base classier selection in Algorithm 2. e algorithm
rst checks the agreement on the privacy label between all the base
Target image T (Private)
Presentation, Day, School
Town-hall, Girls, People
Outdoor
#1 Neighborhoods
NTV (kv = 7) N
T
P (kp = 5)
#2 “Competence” Features (Φ)
ϕo 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.67
ϕ1 ϕ2 ϕ3
ϕs 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.58
ϕt 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.99
#3 Dynamic Fusion of
Multi-Modality
Is a base classier competent?
Competent base classiers
are selected.
Co Cs Ct
Bo
CSo = 0.97
Object CNN
Bs
CSs = 0.08
Scene CNN
Bt
CSt = 0.99
Tag CNN
Private Private
#Votes
Private : 0.97 (CSo ) + 0.99 (CSt )
= 1.96
Public : 0
Majority Vote: Private
Figure 2: Illustration of the proposed approach using an example.
classiers in B (Alg. 2, line 5). If not all the base classiers agree,
then we estimate the competence of all the base classiers and
identify the subset of most competent base classiers for the target
image as follows. Given target image T , Algorithm 2 rst identies
both the neighborhoods (NTV , N
T
P ) using the visual features F
ost
and privacy prole fromDE dataset (Alg. 2, lines 7–9). Using these
neighborhoods, we extract “competence” feature vectors (explained
in Section 4.2) and provide them to the respective “competence”
classiers in C (learned in the Training Phase) to predict compe-
tence score of base classier Bi . If the competence score is greater
than 0.5, then base classier Bi is identied as competent to predict
the privacy of target image T (Alg. 2, lines 10–17). Finally, we
weight votes of the privacy labels predicted by the subset of most
competent base classiers by their respective “competence” score
and take a majority vote to obtain the nal privacy label for target
image T (Alg. 2, line 18). A “competence” score CSi is given as
a probability of base classier Bi being competent. We consider
the majority vote of the most competent base classiers because
certain images (e.g., vacation) might require more than one base
classiers (object and scene) to predict the appropriate privacy. If
both the privacy classes (private and public) get the same number
of votes, then the class of a highest posterior probability is selected.
Illustration of the Proposed Approach . Figure 2 shows the
illustration of the proposed approach through an anecdotal example.
We consider a target imageT whose privacy has to be predicted. For
T , we rst identify two neighborhoods: (1) visual content (NTV ), 2.
privacy prole (NTP ). For N
T
V , we use visual content features F
ost to
compute the similarity between target imageT and the images from
the dataset DE . e top kv = 7 similar images for NTV are shown
in the gure (le blue rectangle). Likewise, for NTP , we compute
the similarity between privacy prole of the target image T and
privacy proles of images in DE . We show the top kp = 5 similar
images for NTP in the right blue rectangle of Figure 2. From these
neighborhoods, we derive a “competence” feature vector ϕ for each
base classier in B (e.g., ϕo for Bo ). We show these “competence”
features in the gure as a matrix of feature values. We input these
features to the respective “competence” classiers from C (e.g., ϕo
toCo ), that predict whether a base classier Bi ∈ B is competent to
predict correct privacy label of the target image (T ). e “compe-
tence” classiers (Co ,Cs ,Ct ) are shown as blue rectangles on the
right side of Figure 2. e base classiers Bo and Bt are predicted as
competent and hence are selected to obtain the nal privacy label
for the target image. e competent base classiers are shown in
green rectangles on the right side of Figure 2. Once we select the
competent base classiers, we take a weighted majority vote on
the privacy labels, predicted by these base classiers. For example,
in this case, the competent base classiers Bo and Bt predict the
privacy of T as “private,” and hence, the nal privacy label of T is
selected as “private.” It is interesting to note that the target image
(T ) contains “outdoor” scene context that is not useful to predict the
correct privacy label and hence, the scene model Bs is not selected
by the proposed approach for the target image.
5 DATASET
We evaluate our approach on a subset of 32, 000 Flickr images
sampled from the PicAlert dataset, made available by Zerr et al.
[2012]. PicAlert consists of Flickr images on various subjects, which
are manually labeled as public or private by external viewers. e
guideline to select the label is given as: private images belong to the
private sphere (like self-portraits, family, friends, someone’s home)
or contain information that one would not share with everyone
else (such as private documents). e remaining images are labeled
as public. e dataset of 32, 000 images is split in DT , DE and
Test sets of 15, 000, 10, 000 and 7, 000 images, respectively. Each
experiment is repeated 5 times with a dierent split of the three
subsets (obtained using 5 dierent random seeds) and the results
are averaged across the ve runs. e public and private images
are in the ratio of 3:1 in all subsets.
6 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We evaluate the privacy prediction performance obtained using the
proposed approach DMFP, where we train a set of base classiers
B on images in the dataset DT , and dynamically estimate the
“competence” of these base classiers for target images in Test by
identifying neighborhoods (NV ,NP ) using images in DE . We rst
consider various values of neighborhood parameters kv and kp and
show their impact on the performance of the proposed approach.
en, we compare the performance of the proposed approach with
the performance obtained using three types of mechanisms: (1)
components of the proposed approach, that are used to fuse the
multi–modal characteristics of online images, (2) the state-of-the-
art approaches for privacy prediction, and (3) strong baselines that
select models based on their competence (e.g., Zahavy et al. [56])
and that aempt to yield the optimal combination of base classiers
(for instance, using stacked ensemble classiers).
Evaluation Seing. We train base classiers (B) using the
Calibrated linear Support Vector Machine (SVM) implemented in
Scikit-learn library to predict more accurate probabilities. We use
3-fold cross-validation on the dataset DT to t the linear SVM on
the 2−folds, and the remaining fold is used for calibration. e
probabilities for each of the folds are then averaged for prediction.
We train “competence” classiers (C) on the dataset DE using
logistic regression to predict “competence” scores between 0 − 1
for base classiers. If base classier Bi gets a “competence” score
greater than 0.5 then the base classier is considered competent.
To derive features from CNN, we use pre-trained models presented
by the VGG-16 team in the ILSVRC-2014 competition [41] and the
CAFFE framework [20]. For deep tags, we consider top d = 10
object labels as d = 10 worked best.
Exploratory Analysis. We provide exploratory analysis in Ta-
ble 2 to highlight the potential of merging object, scene and tag
Test Pr(%) Pu(%) O(%)
Object is correct 49 95.7 84.8
Scene is correct 51 94.7 84.4
Tag is correct 57 91.1 83
All are correct 30 87.3 73.9
All are wrong 27 1.5 7.4
Atleast one 73 98.5 92.6
modality is correct
Table 2: Exploratory analysis.
modality for pri-
vacy prediction. We
predict privacy for
images in the Test
set using base clas-
siers in B and ob-
tain “private” (Pr),
“public” (Pu) and
“overall” (O) accu-
racy for: (a) a modal-
ity is correct (e.g.,
object), (b) all modalities are correct, (c) all modalities are wrong,
and (d) at least one modality is correct. Table 2 shows that out of
the three base classiers (top 3 rows), the tag model yields the best
accuracy for the private class (57%). Interestingly, the results for “at
least one modality is correct” (73%) show that using multi-modality,
there is a huge potential (16%) to improve the performance of the
private class. is large gap is a promising result for developing
multi-modality approaches for privacy prediction. Next, we evalu-
ate DMFP that achieved the best boost in the performance for the
private class using these modalities.
6.1 Impact of Parameters kv and kp on DMFP
We show the impact of neighborhood parameters, i.e., kv and kp
on the privacy prediction performance obtained by the proposed
approach DMFP. kv and kp are used to identify visual (NV ) and
privacy prole (NP ) neighborhoods of a target image, respectively
(Alg. 2 lines 7–8). We experiment with a range of values for both
the parameters kv ,kp = {10, 20, · · · , 100, 200, · · · , 1000}, in steps
of 10 upto 100 and then in steps of 100. We also experiment with
larger kv and kp values, but for beer visualization, we only show
the values with signicant results. Figure 3 shows the F1-measure
Figure 3: F1-measure obtained
for various kv and kp values.
obtained (using 3-fold
cross-validation on the
DE dataset) for the pri-
vate class for various kv
and kp values. We no-
tice that when we in-
crease the kv parame-
ter the performance in-
crease whereas when
we increase kp param-
eter, the performance
increases upto kp =
200, then the perfor-
mance decreases gradu-
ally. e results show that the performance is quite sensitive to
changes in the privacy neighborhood (NP ) parameter kp , but rel-
atively insensitive to changes in the visual neighborhood (NV )
parameter kv . We get the best performance for kv = 900 and
kp = 100. We use these parameter values in the next experiments.
6.2 Evaluation of the Proposed Approach
We evaluate the proposed approach DMFP for privacy prediction
in an ablation experiment seing. Specically, we remove a partic-
ular component of the proposed approach DMFP and compare the
performance of DMFP before and aer the removal of that com-
ponent. We consider excluding several components from DMFP:
(1) the visual neighborhood NV (DMFP−NV ), (2) the privacy pro-
le neighborhood NP (DMFP−NP ), (3) “competence” features (e.g.,
DMFP−ϕ1), and (4) base classier selection without “competence”
learning (e.g., NV − CL). For option (4), we consider a simpler
version of the proposed algorithm, in which we do not learn a com-
petence classier for a base classier; instead, we rely solely on the
number of accurate predictions of the samples from a neighborhood.
We evaluate it using images from three regions: (a) neighborhood
NV only (NV −CL), (b) neighborhood NP only (NP −CL), and (c)
both the neighborhoods NP and NV ({NP + NV } −CL).
Table 3 shows the class-specic (private and public) and overall
performance obtained by the proposed approach (DMFP) and aer
removal of its various components detailed above. Primarily, we
wish to identify whether the proposed approach characterizes the
private class eectively as sharing private images on the Web with
everyone is not desirable. We observe that the proposed approach
achieves the highest recall of 0.627 and F1-score of 0.684 (private
class), which is beer than the performance obtained by eliminat-
ing the essential components (e.g., neighborhoods) of the proposed
approach. We notice that if we remove either of the neighborhood
Private Public Overall
Features Precision Recall F1-score Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy (%) Precision Recall F1-score
DMFP 0.752 0.627 0.684 0.891 0.936 0.913 86.36 0.856 0.859 0.856
Components of the proposed approach
DMFP−NV 0.763 0.575 0.655 0.879 0.945 0.91 85.79 0.85 0.852 0.847
DMFP−NP 0.74 0.572 0.645 0.877 0.938 0.907 85.21 0.843 0.847 0.841
NV −CL 0.79 0.534 0.637 0.87 0.956 0.911 85.71 0.85 0.851 0.843
NP −CL 0.788 0.537 0.639 0.87 0.956 0.911 85.73 0.85 0.851 0.843
{NV + NP } −CL 0.79 0.534 0.637 0.87 0.956 0.911 85.71 0.85 0.851 0.843
“Competence” Features
DMFP−ϕ1 0.777 0.553 0.646 0.874 0.951 0.911 85.74 0.849 0.852 0.844
DMFP−ϕ2 0.74 0.565 0.641 0.875 0.939 0.906 85.11 0.842 0.846 0.84
DMFP−ϕ3 0.752 0.627 0.683 0.891 0.936 0.913 86.35 0.856 0.859 0.856
Table 3: Evaluation of dynamic multi-modal fusion for privacy prediction (DMFP).
NV or NP , the recall and F1-score drop by 5% and 4%. is suggests
that both the neighborhoods (NV , NP ) are required to identify an
appropriate local region surrounding a target image. It is also inter-
esting to note that the performance of DMFP−NP (removal of NP )
is slightly lower than the performance of DMFP−NV (removal of
NV ), depicting that neighborhood NP is helping more to identify
the competent base classier(s) for a target image. e NP neigh-
borhood brings images closer based on their privacy probabilities
and hence, is useful to identify the competent base classier(s) (this
is evident in Figure 2). We also show that when we remove compe-
tence learning (CL) i.e., NV −CL, NP −CL, and {NV + NP} −CL,
the precision improves by 4% (private class), but the recall and F1-
score (private class) drops by 9% and 5% respectively, showing that
competence learning is necessary to achieve the best performance.
We also remove the “competence” features one by one and record
the performance of DMFP to understand which competence fea-
tures are essential. Table 3 shows that when we remove feature
ϕ1 corresponding to the neighborhood NV , the performance drops
signicantly (≈ 4%). Likewise, when we remove ϕ2 (feature corre-
sponding the NP region), we notice a similar decrease of 4% in the
F1-score of private class. Note that, when we remove the “compe-
tence” features corresponding to their neighborhoods (such as ϕ1
for NV and ϕ2 for NP ), we get nearly similar performance as we
remove the respective neighborhoods from the proposed approach
(DMFP−NV and DMFP−NP ); implying that removing “competence”
features (e.g., ϕ1) is as good as removing the corresponding neigh-
borhood (NV ). However, a close look at the performance suggests
that the performance obtained using DMFP−ϕ1 (recall of 0.553) is
slightly worse than the performance of DMFP−NV (recall of 0.57).
Similarly, for DMFP−ϕ2, the performance (recall) decrease from
0.572 obtained using DMFP−NP to 0.565. e performance decrease
can be explained as when we remove the neighborhood NV or NP ,
the respective “competence” features are empty, and that might be
helpful for some cases (as zero-valued ϕ2 feature of ϕs was helpful
in Figure 2). Additionally, the recall of DMFP−NV and DMFP−NP
are similar whereas the recall of DMFP−ϕ1 (0.553) is slightly worse
than the recall of DMFP−ϕ2 (0.565). e results suggests that the
neighborhood NV is more dependent on the “competence” features
as compared to the neighborhood NP . We experimented with the
probability based “competence” features (instead of boolean fea-
tures), but did not yield improvements in the performance.
Model
(a) (b) (c) (d)
DMFP 3 3 3 7
Object 7 3 3 7
Scene 3 7 3 7
Tags 3 3 7 7
Figure 4: Predictions for private images.
6.3 Proposed Approach vs. Base Classiers
We compare privacy prediction performance obtained by the pro-
posed approach DMFP with the set of base classiers B: 1. object
(Bo ), 2. scene (Bs ), and 3. image tags (Bt ).
Table 4 compares the performance obtained by the proposed
approach (DMFP) and base classiers. We achieve the highest
performance as compared to the base classiers and show a maxi-
mum improvement of ≈ 10% in the F1-score of private class. We
notice that our approach based on multi-modality yields an im-
provement of 11% over the recall of object and scene models and
an improvement of ≈ 6% over the recall of the tag model, that is
the best-performing single modality model obtained for the private
class from the exploratory analysis (refer to Table 2). Still, our ap-
proach makes some errors (See Table 2 and 3, 73% vs. 62%). A close
look at the errors discovered that a slight subjectivity of annotators
could obtain dierent labels for similar image subjects (e.g., food
images are very subjective).
Error Analysis. We perform error analysis to further analyze
B overall private public
object 16.52 14.00 23.75
scene 27.71 21.78 42.63
Tags 37.02 26.90 58.79
Table 6: Errors corrected (%).
the results of the pro-
posed approach. We
rst determine the er-
rors generated by all the
base classiers in B and
corrected by the pro-
posed approach DMFP.
We calculate the per-
centage of corrected er-
rors for private class, public class and overall (considering both the
classes) and show them in Table 6. We compute the percentage of
corrected errors as the number of corrected errors of private (or
Private Public Overall
Features Precision Recall F1-score Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy (%) Precision Recall F1-score
DMFP 0.752 0.627 0.684 0.891 0.936 0.913 86.36 0.856 0.859 0.856
Object (Bo ) 0.772 0.513 0.616 0.864 0.953 0.907 84.99 0.843 0.85 0.838
Scene (Bs ) 0.749 0.51 0.606 0.863 0.947 0.903 84.45 0.836 0.844 0.833
Image tags (Bt ) 0.662 0.57 0.612 0.873 0.91 0.891 83.03 0.823 0.83 0.826
Table 4: Dynamic multi-modal fusion for privacy prediction (DMFP) vs. base classiers of DMFP.
Private Public Overall
Features Precision Recall F1-score Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy (%) Precision Recall F1-score
DMFP 0.752 0.627 0.684 0.891 0.936 0.913 86.36 0.856 0.859 0.856
Zahavy et al. [56] 0.662 0.568 0.612 0.873 0.911 0.891 83.02 0.82 0.825 0.821
Majority Vote 0.79 0.534 0.637 0.87 0.956 0.911 85.71 0.85 0.851 0.843
Decision-level Fusion 0.784 0.555 0.65 0.874 0.953 0.912 85.94 0.852 0.853 0.846
Stacked–En 0.681 0.59 0.632 0.879 0.915 0.897 83.86 0.829 0.834 0.831
Cluster–En 0.748 0.429 0.545 0.845 0.956 0.897 83.17 0.822 0.831 0.814
Table 5: Dynamic multi-modal fusion for privacy prediction (DMFP) vs. baselines.
public) class over the total number of private (or public) class errors.
We calculate the fraction of overall corrected errors by considering
both public and private classes. e table shows that we correct
14% − 27% of private class errors, 18% − 58% of public class errors
and overall we eliminate 16% − 37% errors. Note that errors gener-
ated for the private class are much larger than the public class (See
Table 4) and hence, even a comparatively smaller percentage of
corrected errors constitute to a signicant improvement. We also
analyze results by showing predictions of samples in Figure 4, for
which at least one base classier fails to predict the correct privacy
of an image. For instance, for example (b), scene model failed to
predict the correct privacy of the image; however, DMFP identies
the competent base classiers, i.e., object, and tag and predict the
correct privacy label. We also show an example (image (d)) for
which all the base classiers fail to predict the correct privacy class
and hence, the proposed approach also fails to predict the correct
label. e image of a food is very subjective and hence, generic base
classiers will not be sucient to predict the correct labels of such
images. In the future, these generic models can be extended to de-
velop hybrid approaches, that consider both generic and subjective
privacy notions to predict personalized privacy labels.
6.4 Proposed Approach vs. Baselines
We compare the performance of the proposed approach DMFP with
multi-modality based baselines described below.
1. Model Selection by Zahavy et al. [56]: e authors pro-
posed a deep multi-modal architecture for product classication in
e-commerce, wherein they learn a decision-level fusion policy to
choose between image and text CNN for an input product. Speci-
cally, the authors provide class probabilities of a product as input
to the policy trained on a validation dataset and use it to predict
whether image CNN (or text CNN) should be selected for the input.
In other words, policy determines the competence of the CNNs for
its input and thus, we consider it as our baseline. For a fair compari-
son, we learn 3 policies (corresponding to the competence classiers
C), wherein each policy (say object policy) predicts whether the re-
spective base classier (object) should be selected for a target image.
Note that we learn these policies on the DE dataset. Finally, we
take a majority vote of the privacy label predicted by the selected
base classiers (identied by the policies) for a target image.
2. Majority Vote: We consider a majority vote as another base-
line, as we use it for nal selection of privacy label for a target image.
Unlike our approach, a vote is taken without any pre-selection of
base classiers. We predict privacy of a target image using base
classiers in B and select a label having highest number of votes.
3. Decision-level Fusion: Fixed rules, that average the predic-
tions of the dierent CNNs [25] or select the CNN with the highest
condence [38]. e rst rule is equivalent to the majority vote
baseline, and hence, we show the results for the second rule only.
e second rule is given as: YT = arдmaxi ([Pi o + Pi s + Pi t ]/3),
where i = 0 (public), 1 (private). Po , Ps , and P t denotes the pos-
terior probabilities (private or public) obtained using object (Bo ),
scene (Bs ) and tag (Bt ) modality respectively.
4. Stacked Ensemble (Stacked–en): Stacking learns a meta-
classier to nd an optimal combination of the base learners [5, 26].
Unlike bagging and boosting, stacking ensembles robust and diverse
set of base classiers together, and hence, we consider it as one of
the baselines. We use the same set of base classiers B to encode
images in DT using posterior probabilities P(YI = private |I ,Bi )
and P(YI = public |I ,Bi ) where Bi ∈ B. We train a meta-classier
on this encoded DT dataset using calibrated SVM classier. We
use this meta-classier to predict privacy class of an encoded target
image T (using the posterior probabilities obtained by the base
classiers P(YT = private |T ,Bi ) and P(YT = public |T ,Bi )). As we
use DE only to learn “competence” classiers, we do not consider
it for training a meta-classier for a fair comparison.
5. Clusters-based Models (Cluster–en): We create 5 clusters
of DT dataset using hierarchical clustering mechanism and the
combination of object, scene and tag features (Fost ). We train
a calibrated SVM model on each cluster using the combination
of features Fost . For target image T , the most relevant cluster is
Private Public Overall
Features Precision Recall F1-score Precision Recall F1-score Accuracy (%) Precision Recall F1-score
DMFP 0.752 0.627 0.684 0.891 0.936 0.913 86.36 0.856 0.859 0.856
PCNH [52] 0.689 0.514 0.589 0.862 0.929 0.894 83.15 0.819 0.825 0.818
Concat [51] (F ost ) 0.671 0.551 0.605 0.869 0.917 0.892 83.09 0.82 0.826 0.821
Table 7: Dynamic multi-modal fusion for privacy prediction (DMFP) vs. prior image privacy prediction works.
identied using k = 15 nearest neighbors, and the model trained
on that cluster is used to predict the privacy of the target image.
We consider this as another baseline, because clustering images
that are shared online, brings similar image types (e.g., portraits)
together and models trained on these clusters can be competent
to predict privacy of target images of respective image types. e
number of clusters and neighbors are estimated based on the DE
dataset.
Table 5 compares the performance obtained by the proposed
approach DMFP with the performance obtained using the baseline
models. We observe that DMFP learns beer privacy characteristics
than baselines with respect to private class by providing improve-
ments of 4.5%−14% and 4%−20% in the F1-score and recall of private
class. When we learn the “competence” of the base classiers (B)
on theDE dataset without identifying the neighborhoods (the rst
baseline, Zahavy et al. [56]), the precision, recall and F1-score drop
by 9%, ≈ 6%, ≈ 7%. It is interesting to note that the precision of
DMFP−CL (Refer Table 3, NV − CL, NP − CL, {NV + NP } − CL),
i.e., 0.79 is beer than the rst baseline (Zahavy et al. [56]), i.e.,
0.662 whereas the recall of the rst baseline (0.568) is beer than
DMFP−CL (0.534). However, when we combine the neighborhoods
({NV + NP }) and the rst baseline (competence learning), i.e., the
proposed approach DMFP, we get beer performance than each
of these methods. Another detail to note that the performance
of the rst baseline (Zahavy et al. [56]) is very close to the im-
age tags model (see Table 5, 4) and even though the baseline uses
multi-modality, the performance does not exceed signicantly over
the individual base classiers (object, scene, image). Zahavy et al.
[56] performed well for product classication, but it failed to yield
improved results for privacy prediction because unlike product im-
ages or ImageNet images (that contains single object in the image),
images that are shared online are much more complex (containing
multiple objects, and scene) and diverse (having dierent image
subjects such as self-portraits, personal events). e results sug-
gest that it is hard to generalize the competency of base classiers
on all types of image subjects and hence, the competence of the
base classiers needs to be determined dynamically based on the
neighborhoods of a target image.
Table 5 also shows that F1-measure of private class improves
from 0.637 achieved by majority vote (the second baseline), 0.65
obtained by decision-level fusion (the third baseline), 0.636 obtained
by stacked–en (the fourth baseline), and 0.545 obtained by cluster–
en (the h baseline) to 0.684 obtained by DMFP. Additionally, we
notice that the proposed approach is able to achieve a performance
higher than 85% in terms of all compared measures. Note that a
naive baseline which classies every image as “public” obtains an
accuracy of 75%. With a paired T-test, the improvements over the
baseline approaches for F1-measure of a private class are statistically
signicant for p-values < 0.05.
6.5 Proposed Approach vs. Prior Image Privacy
Prediction Works
We compare the privacy prediction performance obtained by the
proposed approach DMFP with the state-of-the-art works of privacy
prediction: 1. object [49, 50] (Bo ), 2. scene [51] (Bs ), 3. image
tags [45, 49, 50] (Bt ), 4. PCNH privacy framework [52], and 5.
Concatenation of all features [51]. Note that the rst three works
are the feature sets of DMFP and are evaluated in the Experiment
6.3. We describe the remaining prior works (i.e., 4 and 5) in what
follows. 4. PCNH privacy framework [52]: e framework com-
bines features obtained from two architectures: one that extracts
convolutional features (size = 24), and another that extracts object
features (size = 24). e object CNN is a very deep network of
11 layers obtained by appending three fully-connected layers of
size 512, 512, 24 at the end of the fully-connected layer of AlexNet
[25]. e PCNH framework is rst trained on the ImageNet dataset
[40] and then ne-tuned on a privacy dataset. 5. Combination
of Object, Scene and User Tags (Concat) [51]: Tonge et al. [51]
combined object and scene tags with user tags and achieved an
improved performance over the individual sets of tags. us, we
compare the proposed approach with the SVM models trained on
the combination of all feature sets (Fost ) to show that it will not
be adequate to predict the privacy of an image accurately. In our
case, we consider object and scene visual features instead of tags
and combine them with user tags to study multi-modality with the
concatenation of visual and tag features.
Table 7 compares the performance obtained by the proposed
approach (DMFP) and prior works. We achieve the highest per-
formance as compared to the prior works and show a maximum
improvement of ≈ 10% in the F1-score of private class. We notice
that our approach based on multi-modality yields an improvement
of 11% over the recall of almost all the prior works (Refer Table 4 and
7). Particularly, we show improvements in terms of all measures
over the PCNH framework, that uses two kinds of features object
and convolutional. We found that adding high-level descriptive
features such as scene context and image tags to the object features
help improve the performance. In addition to the individual feature
sets, we also outperform the concatenation of these feature sets
(denoted as “Concat”), showing that “Concat” could not yield an
optimal combination of multi-modality. We notice that the perfor-
mance of “Concat” is slightly lower than the performance of base
classiers (Refer Tables 4 and 7). We nd this is consistent with
Zahavy et al. [56] results, that concatenated various layers of image
and tag CNN and trained the fused CNN end-to-end but did not
yield a beer performance than the individual CNN (image or tag).
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we estimate the competence of object, scene and image
tag modalities, derived through convolutional neural networks
and dynamically identify the set of most competent modalities
for a target image to adequately predict the class of the image as
private or public. e proposed approach contains three stages
wherein we rst identify neighborhoods for a target image based
on visual content similarity and privacy prole similarity. en,
we derive “competence” features from these neighborhoods and
provide them to the “competence” classiers to predict whether
a modality is competent for the target image. Lastly, we select
the subset of the most competent modalities and take a majority
vote to predict privacy class of the target image. Experimental
results show that our approach predicts the sensitive (or private)
content more accurately than the models trained on an individual
modality (object, scene, and tags), multi-modality baselines and
prior privacy prediction approaches. Also, our approach could aid
other applications such as event understanding, image classication,
to on the y decide which CNN (object, scene or tag) to use based
on a target image.
In the future, it will be interesting to study dynamic multi-modal
fusion in personalized privacy seing. Also, other types of compe-
tence learning approaches and competence features can be devel-
oped for estimating the competence of base classiers.
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